By way of response to the show cause notice regarding the penalty in its reply dated 22.3.2006, the assesse. claimed that all the details given in the return were correct, there was no concealment of income nor were any inaccurate particulars of such income furnished. It was pointed out that the disallowance made by the Assessing Authority in the Assessment Order under Section 143(3) of the Act were solely on account of different views taken on the same set of facts and, therefore, they could at the most be termed as difference of opinion but nothing to do with the concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of such income. It was claimed that mere disallowance of the claim in the assessment proceedings could not be the sole basis for levying penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act. It was submitted specifically that it was an investment company and in its own case for Assessment Year 2000-01 the Commissioner had deleted the disallowance of interest made by the Assessment Officer and the Tribunal has also confirmed the stand of the Commissioner for that year and, therefore, it was on the basis of this that the expenditure was claimed. It was further submitted that making a claim, which is rejected, would not make the assesse company liable under Section 271(1) of the Act.Shri Bhattacharya, learned Additional Solicitor General submits that Commissioner, the Tribunal as well as the High Court have ignored the positive language of Section 271(1) of the Act. He pointed out that the claim of the Interest expenditure was totally without legal basis and was made with the mala fide intentions. It was further pointed out that the claim made for the interest expenditure was not accepted by the Assessing Authority nor by the Commissioner and, therefore, it was obvious that the claim for the interest expenditure did not have any basis. He further pointed out that the contention about the earlier claims being finalized was also not correct as the appeal was pending before the High Court against the order of the Tribunal for the year 2000-01. According to him, even otherwise, the expenditure on interest could not have been claimed in law, as under Section 36(1) of the Act only the amount of interest paid in respect of capital borrowed for the purposes of the business or profession could have been claimed and it was clear that the interest in the present case was not in respect of the capital borrowed.Our attention was also invited to Section 14 of the Act, which provides that no deduction could be allowed in respect of the expenditure incurred by the in relation to income, which does not form part of the total Income under this Act. The learned ASG also invited our attention to provision of Section 10(33) to show that the income arising from the transfer of a capital asset could not be reckoned as an income which can form the part of the total income. In support of this proposition, he relied on Sita Mani Rao v. State of UP (1986) 4 SCC 447, in which this Court has held that the High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, should not interfere with a finding of fact of the inferior court or tribunal, except where the finding was perverse and not based on any material evidence or has resulted in manifest injustice. He submitted that in this decision, this Court has further taken the view that if the trial court came to a conclusion, which was possible on the evidence, the High Court will not disturb the conclusion arrived at by the trial court merely because the High Court is of the view that a different conclusion is also possible on the same evidence. He vehemently argued that the High Court has lost sight of these limitations of its jurisdiction and on the basis of its own appraisal of the evidence taken a view that the respondent no.1 was a juvenile on the date of the commission of the offence and has set aside the order of the trial court. Submit